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7Olivier Carrillo
Le toucher au sein de la hiérarchie des sens: étude historique sur l’« autre »
de la vision de Platon à Vésale
Haute école Louvain-en-Hainaut
olivier.carrillo@hotmail.fr
Non seulement les rares histoires des cinq sens existantes débutent seule-
ment avec la Renaissance, ce qui ampute gravement la compréhension qu’elles
pourraient nous apporter, mais en outre il n’existe aucune synthèse histo-
rique qui soit spécifiquement consacrée à ce sens particulier qu’est le toucher.
Une telle carence est pourtant dommageable pour les historiens des sciences.
En effet, si le rôle de la vision dans l’acquisition du savoir est bien connu
des historiens des sciences, il n’en est pas de même pour le toucher. Or celui-
ci n’est pas seulement une source de connaissances parmi d’autres, il est aussi
l’autre de la vision par rapport à laquelle il a, de tout temps, été valorisé
ou dévalorisé. L’histoire de l’acquisition du savoir requiert donc la prise en
compte de l’histoire du toucher, tout comme l’histoire de la vision ne peut
faire l’impasse de son autre, d’autant plus que le mécanisme de la vue a,
parfois, été conçu comme une sorte de toucher.
Un savoir conçu sur le modèle de la vue amène nécessairement au discré-
dit d’un toucher trop incertain, trop animal. Aussi bon nombre de savants
ont dénigré ce sens trop éloigné, à leurs yeux, de l’âme ou de la pensée.
Platon et Descartes lui ont accordé le rang le plus bas, quant à Léonard de
Vinci, il fit de l’œil «le prince des autres sens». Tout en partageant ce point
de vue dans la «Protreptique», Aristote, dans le «De Anima», présente le
toucher comme «la sensation la plus précise chez l’homme», ce qui fait de lui
le «plus intelligent des animaux». Avec Vésale, la main savante se substituera
toutefois à la lecture et à la monstration médiévales.
En dressant l’historique du statut du toucher au sein de la hiérarchie des
sens, nous allons tenter de combler ce manque de la littérature.
8Guy Claessens
Proclus, Kepler and Descartes : the imagination as self-knowledge
Katholieke Universiteit Leuven
Guy.Claessens@hiw.kuleuven.be
Throughout its long-term history, the case of imagination has shed re-
markable light on the connection between body and knowledge. As a hinge-
joint, imagination communicates between the senses and the intellect. Al-
though this mediating movement has been nearly always considered to have
its starting-point in the sense world, the geometrical, productive imagina-
tion presented by the neoplatonist Proclus starts from innate concepts of
the mind which are projected on imagination as on a mirror. Imagination
thus becomes an intermediary receptacle that enables the soul to see its in-
ner self. Nevertheless, from a (neo)platonist perspective this self-knowledge
can at best be secondary and auxiliary, due to imagination’s close connection
with the senses. In this paper, I want to discuss the way in which Proclus’ ge-
ometrical imagination is originally transformed into an epistemology which
gives a central place to the body and sense knowledge. This crucial shift
occurs when Proclus’ text is received by the German astronomer Johannes
Kepler. In the Harmonices Mundi imagination turns into an intermediary
faculty that provides knowledge of our own essence by means of the body.
This viewpoint results from a rehabilitation of the senses as trustworthy or-
gans, to put it in Kepler’s word: ‘the eye has been made as it is because
the body is as it is, and not the other way around.’ In the same period, the
notion of productive imagination appears in the writings of René Descartes.
The difference with the Proclean stance is again similar: Descartes’ safe-
guarding of the quantitative information submitted by the senses enables
imagination to play a constructive role in acquiring true knowledge of the
world. Where Proclus’ imagination as a mirror allows the soul to see itself
despite its bodily locus, both the Keplerian and Cartesian imagination per-
mits the soul to recognize its own essential creativity in the sensible world.
9Julie De Ganck
Jean-Hilaire Keiffer, "la femme" et la société. Biographie sociale et intel-
lectuelle d’un scientifique à la croisée des chemins
Université libre de Bruxelles
mousticlic@gmail.com
Notre exposé se propose de retracer le parcours intellectuel et social de
Jean-Hilaire Keiffer (1864-1941). Formé à la zoologie et à la gynécologie
à Liège, il fit carrière à Bruxelles comme médecin praticien et professeur
d’université.
Ce personnage est surtout connu dans le domaine de l’histoire sociale
en raison de ses actions hygiénistes. Il s’engagea à l’extrême fin du dix-
neuvième siècle aux côtés d’un célèbre avocat féministe et pacifiste bruxel-
lois, Louis Frank, dans la création d’une assurance maternelle obligatoire
pour les femmes salariées. On le retrouva en tant que président de la So-
ciété d’Eugénique durant l’entre-deux-guerres, où il travailla à l’instauration
de consultations prénatales gratuites. En qualité de professeur d’université,
il dispensa également des cours aux infirmières, notamment sur la préven-
tion et le soin des maladies vénériennes. Cet intérêt "social" pour le corps
des femmes nous amène à questionner la façon dont Jean-Hilaire Keiffer en-
visageait la féminité dans ses écrits scientifiques et médicaux. Il travaillait
en effet sur la physiologie des organes génitaux féminins, mais s’intéressait
également à la constitution "psychophysique" de "la femme".
Notre communication se propose donc d’enquêter sur le parcours intellec-
tuel de cette personnalité à travers ses écrits scientifiques dans les domaines
de la biologie, de la gynécologie et de l’anthropologie, en les analysant à la
lumière de ses engagements politiques et sociaux. Faire cette biographie de
Jean-Hilaire Keiffer, c’est relier l’histoire de la pensée scientifique à son his-
toire sociale pour éclairer leurs angles morts respectifs, tout en adoptant une
perspective de genre.
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Paloma de La Vallée Poussin
Ship in movement : History of research in stowing, rolling and pitching
Université catholique de Louvain
paloma.delavallee@uclouvain.be
In the 17th century, Richelieu took the french navy in hands, for the
benefit of the french nation, to create a national navy. An improvement of
efficiency of ships and navigation was actively sought after, leading to the-
oretical research in naval matters, promoted by the State. As an essential
quality of the ship, the stability was subject to research by various authors.
A first turning point was the publication of the « Traité du Navire » by
Pierre Bouguer, which establishes a theoretical expression of static stability.
However, it soon appeared that the static stability computed on basis of
the ship’s plans was insufficient to estimate its sailing qualities. Indeed, the
static stability is directly influenced by stowing, due to the displacement of
the center of gravity. Moreover, the ship movements in rolling and pitching
get stronger with the increase of stability ; and that is, in addition to the un-
easiness brought upon the crew, greatly hazardous to the rigging, and hence
the safety at sea. As a consequence, once the static stability understood,
the Royal Academy of Sciences of Paris proposed a number of prizes for the
establishment of a theory of stowing and a better understanding of rolling
and pitching.
This study shows the important stages in the comprehension of stowing,
rolling and pitching. A first attempt at a theory can be attributed to Hoste,
in his « Theorie de la Construction des vaisseaux » of 1689. In the 18th
century, Daniel Bernoulli and Leonard Euler did a lot for the establishment
of the rolling and pitching theory in calm water. Around the same period,
Jean-Albert Euler, and the Abbé Bossut both proposed a theory of stowing.
Finally, in the late 18th, the theory of rolling and pitching was extended to
encompass the movements of ships in waves.
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Denis Diagre & Ivan Hoste
A Case Study of the Changing Scientific Community after The Origin:
François Crépin’s Conversion to Darwinism
National Botanic Garden of Belgium
denis.diagre@br.fgov.be,ivan.hoste@br.fgov.be
A long footnote in the first edition of Crépin’s Manuel de la Flore de
Belgique (1860) shows that the young botanist was at first very reluctant to
follow the path paved by Charles Darwin in The Origin of Species, published
in November 1859, only a few months before the Manuel. A decade later,
the self-educated botanist, who had been struggling with the species concept
for years, had changed his mind. Hundreds of letters from dozens of Euro-
pean botanists and a wealth of articles in several botanical and horticultural
magazines, many of them on the taxonomy of the complex genus Rosa, gave
the authors a good opportunity to depict the fascinating intellectual journey
of this emerging botanical notability.
How did François Crépin, raised in a conservative milieu, actually sub-
scribe to the new paradigm? How did he cope with social pressure, in-
tellectual conservatism, lack of formal education and a need for a better
professional situation? Who and what did he struggle with before becoming
a Darwinist? Did it actually affect his job as a taxonomist?
Moreover, this reconstruction of the life of an individual scientist high-
lights some crucial issues about how the 19th century scientific commu-
nity worked and evolved: the role of scientific—sometimes unsuspected—
networks; the spread of new ideas and concepts in the naturalists’milieu;
the growing dichotomy between amateur and professional science; the note-
worthy role played by European refugees in the history of the sciences in
Belgium. . . These are some of the reasons why we think the career and
ideas of François Crépin deserve further study.
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Lyvia Diser
Between Science and State. The laboratory as policy instrument for the Bel-
gian Goverment (1870-1960)
Katholieke Universiteit Leuven
Lyvia.diser@arts.kuleuven.be
In de hedendaagse maatschappij verschijnt het laboratorium als een po-
lymorfe en alomtegenwoordige instelling, aanwezig op een veelheid van maat-
schappelijke terreinen. Mijn onderzoek behandelt het moderne laboratorium
in zijn hoedanigheid van beleidsvormende instrument voor de moderne wel-
vaartstaat en natiestaat België. Het overheidslaboratorium balanceerde op
het snijvlak van twee sociale werelden: enerzijds de wereld van de overheid en
anderzijds het universum van wetenschappelijke laboratoriumpraktijk. Mijn
onderzoek rond Belgische staatslaboratoria werpt een blik op de culturele
uitwisselingen die in deze border zone, dit grensgebied van gemengde cultu-
rele praktijken, tot stand kwamen.
Zowel de overheid als de laboratoria hadden belangen bij een alliantie. De
moderne staat België beschouwde laboratoriumpraktijk als een waardevolle
bijdrage voor het soort beleid dat hij voor ogen had, en als een aanwinst voor
het zelfprojectie als de moderne staat op burgers en buurlanden. Anderzijds
waren laboratoriumambtenaren van mening dat hun staatsidentiteit waarde
toevoegde aan de maatschappelijke taak die ze voor zichzelf weggelegd zagen.
Laboratoria presenteerden zich als het beleidsinstrument bij uitstek van de
moderne staat en ze wierpen zich op als experts in maatschappelijke kwesties.
De alliantie tussen overheid en laboratoriumpraktijk was er dan ook een van
wederzijds vertrouwen. Het vertrouwen dat de overheid aan haar laboratoria
schonk, was cruciaal voor de monopoliepositie als gezagdrager en expert die
de overheidslaboratoria zich konden aanmeten tegenover de maatschappelijke
groepen tot wie de dienstverlening van de overheidslaboratoria zich richtte,
of op wie de processen van staatsvorming betrekking hadden. Soms rees
er vanuit deze groepen verzet tegen de epistemologische uitbreidingsdrang
van de overheidslaboratoria. Maar vaak hadden ze ook belangen bij een
acculturatie met laboratoriumpraktijk.
De culturele uitwisselingen tussen deze drie stakeholders en de conceptie
en perceptie van de ander en zichzelf zijn het onderwerp van de paper die
ik op de Young Researchers Days wil presenteren. In deze paper zal ik
een globaal beeld schetsen van mijn onderzoek en een aantal resultaten en
vaststellingen bespreken.
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Astrid Elbers
Funding radio astronomy in postwar Netherlands: Dutch radio astronomers
and the Organisation for Pure Scientific Research
Leiden University
elbers@strw.leidenuniv.nl
In the first postwar decade, the new field of radio astronomy grew steadily
in several countries, such as Great Britain, the US, Australia and the Nether-
lands. The instrumentation of which it made use (radio telescopes), required
a lot of funding. Although the Netherlands were devastated by World War
II, radio astronomers succeeded in getting a huge amount of money from
the Organisation for Pure Scientific Research (ZWO, now NWO) from 1948
onwards.
In other countries, radio astronomy grew out of wartime radar technology
and the ties with the military - especially in the US - were very strong.
The first radio astronomers were almost exclusively engineers or physicists
trained in radar technology. Consequently, patronage and funding by the
military were self-evident. In the Netherlands on the other hand, radio
astronomers were formally trained as astronomers and the research explicitly
served astronomical goals. A link with the military was absent. The question
is why - in an era of recovery - radio astronomy became such a priority.
I will argue that besides the traditional arguments of national prestige
and possible spin-offs (telecommunication...), three other factors were cru-
cial. First, there was the postwar positive attitude towards ’pure’ science.
Second, the attitude of the early ZWO in deciding which initiatives should
be supported was rather passive. They left the initiative for a great deal
to the scientists themselves. Third, the number of people involved - radio
astronomers and staff of ZWO - was very small, which left a lot of room for
personal contacts and friendships.
14
Sofie Onghena
An appropriate didactical instrument? Science on Belgian educational radio
and television (ca. 1946 - 1968)
Katholieke Universiteit Leuven
Sofie.Onghena@arts.kuleuven.be
In Belgium educational radio was operational since 1931; educational
television was established in 1962, following the example of France and Great
Britain. Both educational radio and television made programmes on science,
particularly on physics, biology and technology. My research question on
educational science broadcasting in Belgium is twofold: not only the repre-
sentation of science in educational broadcasting meant for secondary schools
will be studied, but also the reception and evaluation of this didactical in-
strument by science teachers will be analysed. This lecture will be based
on BRT-year reports, brochures, correspondence of the Ministry of Educa-
tion and pedagogical periodicals for the period 1946-1968: in these years
educational broadcasting took a growing part in secondary school (science)
curricula.
Science programmes on educational television and radio were only com-
plementary to science education and did not aim at replacing the teacher.
Educational television for instance wanted to illustrate and enliven science
instruction, showing experiments that were not possible in the classroom
because of lack of time, insufficient laboratory equipment or due to techni-
cal or safety reasons. The main purpose of educational broadcasting was to
link education with practical applications in academic laboratories, in daily
and industrial life, where theory was put into practice. Reports and radio
plays from abroad were adapted, for example the BBC-series ‘Science today’
by Charles Parr or a German radio play about the Belgian scientist Leo
Baekeland.
The Belgian Ministry of Education was strongly involved with educa-
tional radio and television and gave instructions to science teachers; princi-
pals were advised to reckon with the broadcasting scheme in school timeta-
bles. However, the pedagogical aim of educational broadcasting in science
lessons was under discussion: some school inspectors were opposed to the
inappropriate fictionalisation of science in radio plays.
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Pieter Raymaekers
Between capital and labour: The social role of engineers in Belgium during
the second half of the nineteenth century
Katholieke Universiteit Leuven
Pieter.Raymaekers@asro.kuleuven.be
This paper examines the (mis)match between social commitment and
technical ingenuity of the Belgian engineer in the nineteenth century. The
social issues, with particular attention to the impact of the Belgian work-
ers’ revolt of 1886 on the discourse of the engineers is regarded as a start-
ing and turning point. We analyse the actions and reactions of both en-
gineering societies and individual engineers in the field (case-study on the
mines of Mariemont and Bascoup). Did the positivistic, technological dis-
course of progress and purely scientific and mathematical research, which
corresponded with the self-image of the engineer, change as a result of this
dramatic, social upheaval and did it evolve towards a more general social
economic context? In other words, was the engineer willing to align his
strong belief in progress with common social progress? The engineer, now
and in the past, is often considered as a technically trained problem solver,
connected to concepts such as positivism and belief in progress or even sci-
entism, expertocracy and technocracy. For most of the nineteenth century,
his primary preoccupations were indeed purely technological and scientific.
Nonetheless, his social impact could hardly be underestimated. As a tech-
nical actor, he made an enormous contribution to the large-scale process of
transformation, which characterized the age of industrial revolution. The
social role of the engineer becomes even more relevant when we consider his
special, professional position and status. He embodied the direct connec-
tion between capital and labour, two powerful opposite groups which were
likely to collide at that time. Other aspects such as the specific role played
by engineers in the development of social services and social legislation or
the influence of engineering education will be included in the analysis. For
example, the dominance of theoretical and mathematical subjects in the
curriculum as opposed to the limited presence of courses such as political
economy, philosophy, etc. reveals an interesting and relevant approach.
16
Truus van Bosstraeten
We are family! Teamwork in Belgian university Laboratories, 1870-1914
Katholieke Universiteit Leuven
Truus.VanBosstraeten@arts.kuleuven.be
Big research groups working on highly specialized subjects are nowa-
days identified with the large-scale science that came into being since the
1970’s. Teamwork is one of the symbols par excellence of this type of sci-
ence, often referred to as Big Science. Collaboration, informal or institution-
alized, has however always been part of science [1]. I want to investigate how
since the advent of the laboratory at Belgian universities in 1870, different
ways of working together and collaboration in- and outside the laboratory
took shape. Who worked in the laboratory? What where current practices?
Which images and metaphors were used to refer to the laboratory or the
group?
Since 1870, the university had become an institution where education
and scientific research were combined. Towards the end of the nineteenth
century the universities of Brussels, Ghent, Leuven and Liège built large
scientific institutes. Despite the fact that different scientific disciplines were
developing, the Belgian university remained a familiar institution with a
relatively small academic staff up until the First World War.
Before considerable numbers of paid personnel entered the lab (this hap-
pened after WWI), labs were mostly populated by a single professor, stu-
dents and a few aides. Not only did this groups work together, they also had
connections outside the laboratory: at the university, national and interna-
tional level. I will investigate broad developments but also highlight several
specific cases. As for the period 1870-1885, I will mostly focus on Belgian
laboratory ‘pioneers’ and for the timeframe 1885-1914 on the new institutes
of physiology founded in Brussels, Ghent, Liège and Leuven.
The focus on ‘teamwork’—the term is used in a broad sense—will enable
the study of laboratory culture both inside and outside the walls of the lab
and therefore it will contribute to the study of the laboratory as an embedded
institution.
Reference:
[1] See for instance MELI, D.B. ‘Authorship and Teamwork around the
Cimento Academy: Mathematics, Anatomy, Experimental Philosophy’, In:
Early Science and Medicine, Vol. 6, No. 2 (2001), pp. 65-95
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Mathieu Cornélis
Taking Relativity Seriously. Minkowski Spacetime, Genidentity and Persis-
tence Through Time
Facultés Universitaires Notre-Dame de la Paix
mathieu.cornelis@fundp.ac.be
The aim of this talk is to bring together two theories involved within
two really different research fields. One is the four-dimensional theory of
persistence through time in a metaphysical point of view, and the other is
the theory of relativity in the field of physics.
It is commonly argued that a four-dimensional object 0 persists through
time by having temporal parts O(t1), O(t2), . . . , O(tx) and a relation of
genidentity between each part. For instance, the brown vest that I’m wearing
is a four-dimensional object which is composed by different temporal parts
(part-5 years ago-“new and clean”, . . . , part-yesterday-“clean but unstitched”,
part-today-“unstitched and faded”) which stand in a relation of genidentity
(“part-5 years ago” and “part-yesterday” are not identical parts of my brown
vest but are genidentical parts of it, i.e. stand over the same world-line of
my vest).
Moreover, it is also argued that, if we take relativity seriously, (1) a four-
dimensional object O has to be framed in a specific relativistic language
(indeed, it’s clear that some pre-relativistic notions, like “moment of time”,
“being wholly present à t”, and the like, has to be banned from our language)
, and (2) to ascribe properties to temporally extended object O, one now has
to keep track of a frame to which its temporal extension refers but also to
keep track of the lorentz’s contractions related.
But some queries arise. Indeed, how could we take the relation between
temporal parts as genidentical if this very relation depends upon a particular
referential frame? If the relation between different parts of a same things
depend fundamentally upon a particular frame, is it possible to conceive
an object (like my brown vest) as invariant through time – as it is often
argued in order to account of the identity of this object? And, finally, is the
concept of invariance in the field of physics ontologically relevant in the field
of metaphysics?
We will conclude by redefining a relation of genidentity between each
temporal part of a 4D object which takes relativity seriously.
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Jan De Winter
Solving the Problem of the Distorted Research Agenda in the Health
Sciences
Ghent University
Jan.DeWinter@UGent.be
A well-known problem in the health sciences is the distorted research
agenda: medical research is tailored to the health problems of the rich, rather
than to the health problems of the poor, and for given health problems, the
most promising lines of research are often neglected because they are not
profitable enough. In the paper, I analyze the problem of the distorted
research agenda in the health sciences in more detail and identify some of
its causes.
Next, I discuss two research policies that are supposed to solve this prob-
lem: the research policy proposed by Thomas Pogge, and the research policy
proposed by James Robert Brown. Pogge suggests that we should establish,
as a supplement to the current market system, a Health Impact Fund that is
used to reward owners of patents on medicines that improve global health.
Brown, on the other hand, thinks we should eliminate patents in medicine
and that all funding of medical research should be made public. I show that
both research policies solve only part of the problem, as they do not elimi-
nate all kinds of distortion. Yet, I do not reject Brown’s recommendations.
A research policy that is based on the elimination of patents in medicine,
and that effectively solves the entire problem, is described and defended in
this paper.
A possible objection against my proposal is that patent protection has
several positive effects, and that without patents, we may not be able to cause
these effects. I rebut this objection by showing how the positive effects of
patent protection in medicine can be achieved without patents. Four positive
effects are discussed: (1) the fact that medical research is sufficiently funded,
(2) the efficient execution of medical research projects, (3) the translation of
medical research results into health outcomes, and (4) the public availability
of medical research results.
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In his Principia philosophiae, Descartes distinguished between two types
of certainty – absolute and moral – claiming for the core part of his physics
to possess “more than moral certainty.” If absolute certainty is reserved for
his metaphysics and most of his physics is described as morally certain,
what he deemed as ‘more than morally certain’ is still a matter of debate in
respect to his natural philosophy. In my paper, I shall refer to Descartes’s
argument for the existence of physical bodies and to its reception in the
philosophical writings of some of his followers. I shall focus in particular on
the views expressed by three Cartesians, namely Jacques du Roure, Géraud
de Cordemoy, and Jacques Rohault. Not only that these authors display
different views on this matter, but they contributed to the development of
a new approach to natural philosophy from a Cartesian point of view. All
of these authors represent interesting case studies in the role of the quest
for certainty in physics, contributing to the current studies on the so-called
“Scientific Revolution.”
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Since the 1970s, some authors maintain that decision theory cannot avoid
causal considerations and, accordingly, they support causal decision theory.
On the other side, philosophy of causality has significantly developed in the
last 50 years, and at least three contemporary conceptions of causality (the
probabilistic, counterfactual, and interventionist theories) are likely to be
referred to in the context of causal decision theory. The question, therefore,
arises whether the conception of causality one adheres to makes a significant
difference to causal decision theory. In a recent paper entitled “Causal rea-
soning and backtracking” (2010), James Joyce suggests a negative answer
to this question. Here, focusing on the counterfactual and interventionist
conceptions of causality, I would like to discuss his arguments and, as a
consequence, qualify the answer he suggests.
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In this article I examine so-called functional or decomposition explana-
tion; a type of explanation that is at the core of the cognitive sciences. I
argue that these explanations take their form because of the epistemic in-
terests of the researchers. Where these interests are restricted to prediction
or sheer intellectual curiosity, showing how a particular cognitive state op-
erates by decomposing it into different elements may be all that is required.
However, if the interests are preventative or therapeutic, such explanations
must be paired with an account of what particular neural feature (or set of
features) is actually responsible for realizing a given state. That is, in these
cases the functional account is ‘deepened’ or ‘augmented’ with information
about the brain: a type of explanation that is known in the literature under
the heading ‘mechanistic explanation’. To illustrate how this works, I will
consider a concrete example taken from scientific practice: the explanation
of neuroticism. It would appear that there are two types of explanation
possible here. The first type defines neuroticism in terms of psychological
states. On this account, neuroticism is an effect induced by other psycho-
logical states, in particular, by depression. It is a complex state, comprised
of several different elements (such as increased anxiety, insecurity etc.). The
second type of explanation cites the actual neural mechanisms involved in
the realization of depression, which, as is corroborated by more than half a
century of research, is a shortage of serotonin, or 5-hydrowytryptamine, in
the brain. As both types of explanation serve different epistemic interests,
explanatory pluralism seems a fitting position for a philosopher to take.
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This paper studies the way in which assessment reports are produced by
consensus conferences. The focus is on climate consensus conferences (as
organised by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) and medical
consensus conferences (as organised by the National Institute of Health and
the Canadian Association of Gastroenterology).
In part 1, I analyse the review process behind the assessment reports by
answering two interwoven questions for each type of conference; i.e. ‘What
are the benefits of consensus conferences?’ and ‘Do we need consensus con-
ferences to attain these benefits?’ The first question is handled by subject-
ing Thagard’s (1999) answer for medical consensus conferences to critical
scrutiny and by looking whether his answer can be extended to climate con-
sensus conferences. As for the second question, I denounce the claim that
meta-analysis is a better alternative.
In part 2, a social-epistemological exercise is undertaken to look whether
the review process of consensus conferences can be altered so as to enhance
its efficiency. Thagard (1999) has stated that it is because of the way the
review-process is built up, that consensus conferences can contribute to the
reliability, fecundity and practical benefit of beliefs. By changing this review-
process we could let consensus conferences make a bigger contribution, thus
increasing its efficiency, which will result in enhancing their position as the
best alternative. First, I propose that there are differences in the way climate
and medical researchers interact with each other, differences that turn out to
have an effect on the efficiency of the corresponding conferences. Secondly, I
propose that extending the group of consensus participants with stakeholders
enhances the reliability of consensus conferences. Applying both proposals
to scientific practice gives a firmer ground to the discipline of social episte-
mology and philosophy of science in general.
References:
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An old story tells how six blind men were asked to determine what the
object in front of them looked like. Each was touching a different part of
an elephant. One describes a pillar, another a rope. The third feels a tree
branch, the fourth a fan. Another says he touches a wall, the last says he
holds a flexible pipe. A wise man explains that all of them are right. The
reason every one of them is telling it differently is because each one touched
a different part of the elephant. The elephant has all the features mentioned,
but to understand what the elephant is, all the different perspectives have
to be integrated - irreconcilable as they may seem.
In the philosophy of science something similar seems at hand. Several
approaches to explain or clarify science co-exist. Many perspectives are
defended, sometimes furiously attacking each other. Understandably so, as
none of them seems to be able to catch the essence of what science really is,
the science as practiced by millions of real people around the clock all over
the world: a messy, ambitious and complex human undertaking, in which
individuals and groups, theory and practice, society and culture each play a
crucial role.
Looking at science as a multilayered process, from an ecological point of
view, could help to re-unite the disparate approaches and paint a picture of
science in all its bewildering complexity. An inspiring case to illustrate this
perspective is the discovery of photosynthesis. This is the most important
biochemical process on earth. Still, very few people seem to know who dis-
covered this, when that happened and how it was done. However, the tale
of Jan IngenHousz (1730-1799) and his scientific endeavours shows science
in action. It opens up an undisclosed chapter of the history of science which
can help to shine some light on the ingredients and processes that shape
the development of science - science as the age-old undertaking of collecting
trustworthy knowledge. The fate of the discovery of photosynthesis and of
photosynthesis research can be better understood if one takes into account as
well the individuals involved, as their social, cultural and historical context,
interwoven in social interactions and interconnected by the theoretical, in-
strumental and practical requirements of their research. This paves the way
for a fresh multidimensional approach in the philosophy of science, taking
steps towards an "ecology of science".
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Although from Europe, mainly from German speaking parts, it is in
United States and England that human genetics has really grown in the
early 20th century. The reasons for that are scientific, ideological and cul-
tural. Firstly, Mendelian genetics is well established in these countries, re-
inforcing a hereditarianism of innate traits. In most of Latin countries, the
biological tradition is Lamarckian and then it is a heredity of acquired traits
that still dominates. Moreover, human genetics in the early 20th is deeply
related to the eugenic movement. Eugenics, although different in U.S.A.
and in England, has been a significant financial and ideological support for
its development as a scientific discipline in these both countries. Germany,
under the leadership of the Nazi regime, has been a major research center
too. On the contrary, in France - and Belgium -, eugenics was related to the
social hygiene movement, so it has mostly stimulated the development of
social reforms in public health domain. For these reasons, and some others
linked to the specific philosophical and sociological contexts of that time,
human genetics has been developed lately in the Latin countries and may be
seen, in a way, as a specific product of Anglo-Saxon culture.
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Il est philosophiquement cruel de vouloir séparer une mère de ses enfants.
Il est tout aussi mathématiquement inadmissible de vouloir séparer une hy-
perbole de ses asymptotes. C’est pourtant ce que l’on fait en cinématique
relativiste. On écrit en effet les trois types d’intervalles de Minkowski res-
pectivement spatial R (hyperbole Ox), lumineux ou nul (asymptote) et tem-
porel T (hyperbole Ot). Les hyperboles parfois appelées “hyperboles d’échelle
de Minkowski” sont très rarement signalées dans la plupart de exposés sur
la relativité restreinte (RR). En effet, on considère généralement que les
asymptotes subsistent lorsque R tend vers l’infini, autrement dit lorsque les
hyperboles disparaissent. Donc le fameux “cône de lumière” subsiste indépen-
damment de l’hyperbole d’échelle qui s’évanouit. En vérité avec un intervalle
infini on retrouve non pas les bissectrices (c = 1) mais les axes Ox (t = 0)
et Ot (x = 0) de la cinématique prérelativiste (sans cône de lumière, sans
vitesse finie, c=1). Admettons dès lors, en totale conformité avec la trans-
formation de Lorentz (TL), qu’il existe non seulement une vitesse FINIE
mais un intervalle spatial FINI. Ce dernier définit un horizon de Hubble R
directement relié à une constante cosmologique qui caractérise le vide spatio-
temporel classique. Cette hyperbole étant une ligne d’univers, il y correspond
aussi une accélération (propre) hyperbolique minimale. Cela résulte immé-
diatement de ce que la TL est une rotation hyperbolique et que dans tout
mouvement de rotation, il y a une accélération “de Milgrom” ou une vitesse
angulaire hyperbolique autrement dit une constante “de Hubble”. En procé-
dant à une petite retouche de la RR (Milne) nous la transformons en une
théorie cosmologique. Nous obtenons ainsi une expansion accélérée de l’Uni-
vers qui est désormais confirmée par les observations récentes. Nos travaux
précisent comment il faut réinterpréter le mouvement rigide de Born-Rindler
et definir le nouveau facteur d’échelle (Bondi) qui doit prendre la place du
facteur d’échelle de la métrique de Friedmann-Lemaître. Ils indiquent aussi
comment il convient de definir une distance hyperbolique avec l’ellipsoïde
lumineux de Poincaré (univers en expansion sans big bang).
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The analysis we develop here is initiated by the fact that the intrinsic
ambiguity of the classical maxim of emergence: « the whole is more than
the sum of the parts » has led today to an impressive conceptual dissemina-
tion which tends to make the debates about relationships between scientific
fields obscure and misleading. Indeed, different interpretations of this clas-
sical maxim gave rise to distinct concepts of emergence that can hardly be
reconciled in a unitary and relevant antireductionist framework.
The prime objective of our paper is then to propose a theoretical con-
struct of a precise philosophical concept of emergence which is antithetic to a
concept of reduction which also has to be clarified. Accordingly, employing
Rudolf Carnap’s terminology, we propose an explicatum of the tradition-
ally ambiguous concept of emergence via three definitional requisites widely
discussed in the scientific literature: supervenience, holism and downward
causation. These conditions allow us to define emergence as in-principle ir-
reducibility, i.e. the logical impossibility to explain and predict a complex
macro-phenomenon from information relative to its micro-structure. The
concept of emergence which satisfies simultaneously these required condi-
tions proves to be (1) faithful to the philosophical legacy of the British
emergentists, (2) philosophically adequate to construct a classificatory pat-
tern which is able to limitate the speculative dangers of the polysemy of
the classical concept and (3) coherent with the fundamental methodological
presuppositions of the scientific practice.
Secondly, on the basis of our explicatum of emergence, we propose a first
taxonomy of different concepts of emergence, a taxonomy in which the taxa
are to be associated with different degrees of satisfaction of the definitional
requisites used in our first conceptualization. By classifying the uses of the
emergence concepts in this way, our taxonomy allows us to clear up the
nebulous debates relating to the reductionism issue.
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Usually it is argued that a necessary truth is true, no matter what situa-
tion holds, therefore it cannot be true in virtue of some specific facts. David
Armstrong, though he agrees with the premise of the argument, believes that
necessary truths are true in virtue of some distinguishable facts: internal re-
lations, and in particular partial identity. I show that taking partial identity
as the truthmaker for some necessary truths, say ’red is a color’, yields inner
problem in Armstrong’s metaphysics. Instead, inspired by his own elegant
system, I suggest that Functional Laws or Invariance is a preferable truth-
maker for such necessary truths. It deserves inner consistence of his system
and compatible with his theory on color as well.
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In aglosaxon academic communities the questions regarding “Science and
religion” have known a powerful development in the past decennia, up to a
point where a new discipline is taking form. One of the issues adressed
there is divine action: how to articulate actions of an intelligent, planning
and intervening deity to a worldview that has the natural sciences as its
prime source of ontological information. In other words, how to make sense
of divine intervention when faced with claims of determinism and laws of
nature that seem to accept no exception? Does it make sense to speak of
the “breaking” of a law of nature, and do we really need this strong-handed
notion? If so, a scientific worldview and a theistic worldview seem to be
mutually exclusive.
We have come a long way since David Hume’s famous essay On Mira-
cles, even when it is still at the center of numerous contributions. Several
solutions have been suggested to disarm this head-on collision of natural and
supernatural causality. For instance, quantum mechanics and chaos theory
have clearly modified the way we think about determinism in physics. But is
this enough to avoid the conflict? A proper enquiry in philosophy of science
is needed here to dig into the ontological status of laws of nature. Em-
piricists, inductivists, necessitarians or essentialists each have given different
accounts of what is a law of nature. We will look especially at the essentialist
viewpoint of Brian Ellis regarding laws of nature, and we will try to draw
conclusions for a modern-day conceptualisation of (what we think to be) the
essence of divine action in a scientific world, i.e. what it is to be a “miracle”,
and we hope to show that this fascinating question in no way ends up in an
irreducible choice between science and religion.
Part III
Logic
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One of the problems with Standard Deontic Logic (henceforth SDL) is
that it trivializes any premise set containing one or more normative conflicts.
Typically, such conflicts are formalized as OA ∧O¬A, where OA stands for
something like “it ought to be the case thatA”, “someone ought to bring about
A”, “I ought to do A” etc. (any of these will do for the present purposes).
For a discussion on the reality of normative conflicts, and for some examples
of their typical formalization, see [2].
The focus on conflicts of the type OA ∧ O¬A has led many authors
to neglect other types of conflicts. As a rather awkward consequence, this
narrow focus has caused the invention of systems that can allow for conflicts
of the type OA ∧ O¬A, but that trivialize conflicts that are in some sense
“weaker” than these.
I will argue that, if one wants to allow for all types of conflicts in de-
ontic logic, one has to make the logic’s negation paraconsistent and that,
moreover, if, as Priest demands in his [3], one wants to maximally isolate
inconsistencies, modal interdefinability assumptions must be relaxed.
I will present the paraconsistent deontic logicDP, which meets the above
demands, but also lacks some intuitive properties of SDL. This shortage,
however, can be met by non-monotonically extending DP to the logic DPr,
which is defined within the adaptive logic framework from [1] and which,
for premise sets containing no normative conflicts, delivers the exact conse-
quences that SDL would deliver.
References:
[1] Batens, Diderik. Adaptive Logics and Dynamic Proofs. Mastering the
Dynamics of Reasoning, with Special Attention to Handling Inconsistency.
Forthcoming.
[2] Gowans, Christopher (ed.). Moral Dilemmas (Oxford University Press,
1987).
[3] Priest, Graham. In Contradiction (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002).
34
Lorenz Demey
Looking for the Right Notion of Epistemic Plausibility Model
Katholieke Universiteit Leuven
Lorenz.Demey@hiw.kuleuven.be
The notion of epistemic plausibility model (EPM) is widely used in con-
temporary epistemic-doxastic logic. However, two of the main authors in
this area, Johan van Benthem and Alexandru Baltag, define these models in
different ways. This paper provides an indirect methodological argument for
Baltag’s definition, by developing the model theory of EPMs.
We first introduce both van Benthem’s and Baltag’s notion of EPM,
and briefly discuss some important operators which can be interpreted on
such models. We then move to the model theory of van Benthem’s EPMs, by
defining various notions of bisimulations (parametrized by a language L), and
showing that L-bisimilarity implies L-equivalence. We establish a Hennesy-
Milner type theorem, and prove two undefinability results. The notion of
bisimulation for conditional belief, however, turns out to be unsatisfactory.
We explore two possible solutions: adding a modality to the language, and
putting extra constraints on the models. At first sight, neither of these
solutions seems to be preferable over the other one.
We then turn to the relationship between bisimulation and dynamic up-
dating. We will show that bisimilarity is preserved by the two main updates
(public announcement and radical upgrade) according to the second solution,
but not to the first solution. Since bisimilarity-preservation is a theoretical
desideratum, the second solution is thus to be preferred over the first one.
Furthermore, we will show that if the extra constraints of the second solu-
tion are imposed on van Benthem’s notion of EPM, then it closely resembles
Baltag’s notion.
This can be summarized as a methodological argument for Baltag’s no-
tion of EPM. Although van Benthem’s notion is more general/expressive
(and thus better suited for concrete modeling purposes), Baltag’s notion
gives rise to a more elegant model theory (while maintaining sufficient gen-
erality). Hence a reflective equilibrium arises, favoring Baltag’s notion.
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My work sets out to investigate the philosophical significance of non-
standard models of arithmetic. In particular, I will strive to put forward
the mutual relationship between Philosophy, Logic and Mathematics with
respect to the study on non-standard models which has taken shape over
recent years.
Not only has non-standard models of arithmetic encountered a scarce
success in what concerns philosophy, but also an organic presentation on the
topic has never been written.
This work will examine three distinct phases in the development of the
research on the non-standard models of arithmetic conceptually as well as
chronologically.
1. Non-standard models as "pathological" problem - the philosophical roots:
I claim that Dedekind (rather than Skolem) should be considered as the
one who discovered non-standard models. I will consider Dedekind’s
letter to Keferstein and his categorical characterisation of his system.
On the other hand, I will discuss Skolem’s proofs of the existence
of non-standard models and their relationship with Skolem’s finitist
mathematical credo.
2. The hybrid phase - some repercussions on the present-day philosophy of
mathematics : I will consider the present attempts to recover from the
mismatch between the scarce interest that philosophy has paid for non-
standard models over the last 60 years and the abundant mathematical
results from the 1960’s on.
The hybrid phase sets out from the consideration given to the mathe-
matical achievements on non-standard models within the philosophical
debate on the nature of arithmetic. Some of those questions concern,
for example, the structuralism as position in philosophy of Mathe-
matics, and possible reasons based on mathematical practice to prefer
second order logic over first order one.
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Our communication will consist in a short description of the Lambda-1
language, i.e. the first-order language of a standard set theory in which has
been introduced a constant Lambda with an interpretation as ‘void/potential’
in the domain D of objects. The constant Lambda denotes a pseudo-object.
The notion of pseudo-object will be defined by contrast with that of object,
in the state of affairs, the notion of set. We will describe the semantics
of the Lambda constant and will establish the axiom of the void; it says
that Lambda belongs to every set; the modification of some axioms of ZF
will follow, including a simplification of the axiom of the infinite set. After
that, we will wonder if the introduction of the Lambda constant allows the
construction of the empty set without the use of an anti-tautology or of a
specific axiom.
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In this paper we study one method for identifying terms in some para-
doxical set theory. Such a theory is based on comprehension restricted to
positive formulas in a first-order language with ∈+, ∈−, =+, =− as primitive
relations, where ∈−, =− respectively stand for the weak negation of ∈+, =+.
Our method for examining such a paradaxical set-theory makes use of
so-called co-admissible models. By introducing a suitable notion of forcing,
we show the existence of a structure G satisfying the comprehension scheme.
In that model, identification of terms is also possible, as follows: whenever
two formulas ϕ and ψ are strongly equivalent, one may conclude that the
corresponding terms {x | ϕ(x)} and {x | ψ(x)} are “positively equal” in G.
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Adaptive logics are standardly characterized by three main elements: a
lower limit logic (LLL), a set of abnormalities, and an adaptive strategy —
see e.g. Batens [1]. The LLL should be a reflexive, transitive, monotonic and
compact logic. Moreover, the LLL should contain classical logic! This last
requirement was introduced to simplify the formulation of the adaptive logics
and the metalinguistic proofs. In this paper, I will elaborate on the possibility
to alter this requirement to the requirement to contain a particular extension
of classical logic, viz. the extension based on the infinitary language Lω1ω
— see e.g. Bell [2] and Nadel [3]. In fact, I will show that the standard
format of adaptive logics can easily be altered accordingly, which is mainly
due to the fact that all required properties still apply to the LLL, albeit in
a slightly different way.
The logical symbols of classical logic were introduced to express metalin-
guistic properties. As these properties range over the infinite, turning to
an infinitary language is not only technically sound, but seems philosoph-
ically sound as well. Moreover, to turn to the infinite also has two major
advantages. First, I will show that, in contradistinction to the standard for-
mat presented in [1], the proof theories of adaptive logics based on different
adaptive strategies can now all be characterized in a unified way. Second,
I will propose a new adaptive strategy, viz. the finite minimal abnormality
strategy, that arises naturally from this unification and that has some very
interesting properties.
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Something in Set Theory have disturbed mathematicians for more than
seventy years: not only the problem of the consistency of NF, but also the
(slight?) modification introduced by Jensen in 1969 to the axioms of NF,
consisting in relaxing the axiom of extensionality so as to allow the exis-
tence of atoms. This modification gave birth to the consistent system NFU,
roughly speaking NF with Urelemente. But we know that this slight modi-
fication of the axiom of extensionality generates quite a lot of changes. For
instance, NF disproves the axiom of choice (AC) whereas NFU doesn’t even
prove an axiom of infinity. However, there is a trend to study models of NFU
to shed light on the possible consistency of NF. Following a suggestion of
Forster, it’s interesting to study models of NFU produced by moving down-
ward/upward an ordinal κ of a model of ZF with automorphism σ and by
trying to reduce the “distance” between κ and σ(κ). Following this way and
thanks to the notion of ambiguity, we study parallelisms between results on
NF and those for NFU. By introducing different notions related to ambiguity,
we will be able to present some possible ways to study the problem of the
(in?)consistency of NF.
40
Sylvia Wenmackers
Indefinitely large and infinite lotteries
Katholieke Universiteit Leuven
sylvia.wenmackers@hiw.kuleuven.be
Exploiting the parallels between large, yet finite lotteries and countably
infinite lotteries, we gain insights in the foundations of probability as well as
in epistemology. In standard probability theory, with the axioms as intro-
duced by Kolmogorov [1], it is not possible to describe a countably infinite
lottery. De Finetti’s reaction to this problem was to replace countable addi-
tivity in the axioms by the weaker requirement of finite additivity [2]. The
probability assignment for a fair, finite N-ticket lottery with exactly one win-
ner is trivial: every ticket has a probability of winning equal to 1/N. From
an epistemological viewpoint however, the case where N » 1 is problematic:
a paradox can be obtained for belief statements about such a lottery. This
lottery paradox was first constructed by Kyburg [3], who concluded that the
conjunction principle (CP) does not hold for rational acceptability. Although
we are in favor of a formal analysis of beliefs, the popular threshold-based
model of belief does not seem adequate. The infinite and finite case can
both be analyzed using a form of nonstandard analysis (NSA) [4]. For the
infinite lottery, NSA makes it possible to assign infinitesimal probabilities to
each ticket. For the finite lottery, we propose a threshold-free model for be-
liefs based on an alternative formulation of NSA, called relative or stratified
analysis [5]. We derive a rule that tells us when CP holds and when it is
violated.
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